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Bad as it may sound, I have to admit that I cannot get along 
as an artist without the use of one or two sciences. 
—Bertolt Brecht1 
Analyses of plays-within-plays and other types of theatrical self-
reflexivity—in a word, metatheatricality—have been problematic. Many tread no 
further than categorization. Those that seek an explanation usually refer to stylistic 
techniques or universal technologies, and so inadequately account for metatheatri-
cality's historical emergence and functions. In short, previous approaches to 
metatheatricality fail to investigate its connections to social dynamics; indeed, 
they are usually founded upon an unacknowledged or an ideological theory of 
society's mode of being—its structure, the individual's place within it, the 
relationships between conceptual and material practices, and so forth. While these 
ideas constitute an ontology of society and culture, such ontological assumptions 
are not well developed by authors interested in metatheatricality. A better ontology 
would provide better historical and theoretical explanations. In this article I will 
outline a social ontology consisting of social structures, agents, and discourses. 
Analyzing theatrical performance in terms of that social ontology, and especially 
its relationship to communication structures, leads to a social definition of 
performance and demonstrates that metatheatricality emerges out of an interaction 
between the structure of theatrical performance and larger social forces. Thus the 
dynamics of metatheatricality (like those of theater itself) depend on social relations 
and vary historically. 
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1 
For some writers, metatheatricality is just a device which takes various 
forms and can be used in various ways. Both Dieter Mehl and Richard Hornby, 
for instance, distinguish various modes, styles, or uses of metatheatricality: Mehl 
examines its types during the English Renaissance, whereas Hornby is mainly 
interested in identifying various kinds (such as the play within the play, the 
ceremony within the play, self-reference, and so forth) without much discussion 
of historical bounds or social conditions. Richard Nelson also finds different 
strategies of metatheatricality, but emphasizes historical transitions, without 
however providing a very strong explanation for those changes.2 These 
discussions—Nelson's particularly—are quite valuable, but their focus on 
categorizing types of metatheatricality is not just their strength, but also their 
limitation. Their findings may be incorporated within a properly explanatory 
analysis, but as they stand, they suggest an understanding of metatheatricality's 
changes as fundamentally arbitrary. Discursive and performance strategies appear 
simply decided upon by individuals, and social trends are no more than the 
agglomeration of individual acts. 
For others writers, such as Lionel Abel and Judd Hubert, "metatheatre" is 
a dramatic genre which does not necessarily involve plays-within-plays or other 
sorts of direct theatrical self-reflexions, but instead has characters engage in their 
own dramatization, acting as playwrights, directors and/or actors within the play. 
For Abel, "metatheatre" arises because metatheatrical playwrights are themselves 
self-conscious. In fact, it appears that for Abel, metatheatre is historically 
coterminous with modern, possessive, self-willed individualism—a crucial aspect 
of Western culture since the late sixteenth century.3 His position not only concerns 
individualism, but also (like the previous ones) adopts it ontologically and 
methodologically, although in this case it takes an expressivist cast. 
According to a further line of thought, however, theatrical self-reflexivity 
has few or no historical boundaries. Instead it results from the very nature of art, 
or in some versions, from the nature of discourse. This, roughly, was the conclusion 
of the Russian formalists. For Victor Shklovsky, artistry was a matter of revealing 
aesthetic devices, and Boris Tomashevsky drew an explicit parallel between that 
activity and the play-within-a-play.4 This understanding of self-reflexivity perhaps 
has been taken farthest by Derrida, for whom self-reference is an inherent part of 
writing, perhaps writing's only meaning. He asks, for instance, why Plato and 
other writers so often condemn writing in writing, and he concludes: 
This "contradiction," which is nothing other than the relation-
to-self of diction as it opposes itself to scription,... is not con-
tingent. In order to convince ourselves of this, it would already 
suffice to note that what seems to inaugurate itself in Western 
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literature with Plato will not fail to re-edit itself at least in Rousseau, 
and then in Saussure.5 
For Derrida, the relation of writing to itself is always the same, always produces a 
phonocentric antagonism toward writing in writing itself, a disparaging self-
referentiality that emerges regardless of any historical contingents whatsoever: it 
is a transhistorical universal. This thesis suggests that self-referentiality remains 
ever-present, takes identical forms, and serves identical functions in all periods; in 
fact it smacks of the "master-key to history" notion that poststructuralists usually 
deride. Despite recognizing that discourse and representation are social forms, 
these positions tend to place them ultimately outside human control, even to the 
point of asserting that they control us. In some versions, language or discourse 
constitute society in toto, and there may be little we can do to change it. 
The theory of self-reference as necessary to art or discourse and the notion 
of metatheatricality as characters' self-dramatization face similar historical 
difficulties. Perhaps the most obvious is that we do not find the same amount—or 
the same type—of metatheatricality in all periods. It appears frequently during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and again in the late nineteenth and 
especially the twentieth century, but less often at other times. If "metatheatre" 
really concerned individualistic consciousness (as Abel has it), one would expect 
more instances of that "genre" from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; 
if it truly were based on the phonocentrism of writing, metatheatricality should 
appear more-or-less evenly whenever and wherever theater appeared, from 
Aeschylus on. 
In fact, as Nelson has argued, it is not just the sheer quantity of 
metatheatricality that changes historically, its uses or functions do as well. Three 
phases are discernable. Initially, the inner play served as a stratagem or a game. 
The Spanish Tragedy and Hamlet offer examples of the inner play as stratagem; 
Bartholomew Fair and The Knight of the Burning Pestle provide instances of the 
play as game. However (writes Nelson), a new conception emerged in the late 
eighteenth century and became increasingly dominant. "The artist as a man, his 
personality for its own sake, becomes the focus of interest in those plays concerned 
with the theater. . . . In the nineteenth century . . . [t]he play is intended not to 
effect but to affect, not to implement an action but to express a being."6 Nelson's 
point has been confirmed in an article by {Catherine Newey, who demonstrates 
that many nineteenth-century melodramas "have for their subject matter the theater 
and the theatrical profession."7 While the representation of theater as a profession 
and an art appears sporadically in earlier eras, in the nineteenth century it became 
the emergent norm of metatheatricality, a norm which continues to be quite 
powerful. Then, in the twentieth century, plays-within-plays regained their strategic 
functions, but now with a strong self-referential aspect, as we will see. 
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This historicity raises questions of the relationship of theatricality and 
metatheatricality to society; and metatheatricality itself raises questions about the 
nature of theater's existence. Yet those questions are precisely what Nelson, Abel, 
Derrida and the rest ignore or even reject, and so produce either a flattened history, 
or one that implicitly belittles either agents' conditions and importunities or their 
resources and powers by presenting stylistic changes as essentially arbitrary, volun-
taristic or nominal. The moment one accepts the possibility of a complex, 
multileveled universe—an ontology permitting depth—the picture changes. This 
is where the ontology of theater and society come in. 
2 
One of the key concepts behind my analysis is that of discursive and 
performance strategies. I put the terms "discursive" and "performance" together 
for several reasons. The understanding of discourse invoked here is a broad one, 
concerning the logical and analogical relations established among concepts and 
representations, and admitting all forms of representation (not just language). The 
idea of a discursive strategy is similar to the episteme, which, as Foucault suggests, 
is embodied not only in theories and speculations, but also in processes, techniques, 
and effects, such as a painter's use of space, color, proportions, contours, and even 
gestures.8 These manifestations are performative in nature. Performance strategies, 
then, encompass playwriting, directing, acting, scenic design, costuming, and all 
other aspects of performance. Thus performance necessarily involves discourse, 
and discourse (as I explain more fully later) is inherently performative. These 
strategies embody ways of managing similar (though not necessarily identical) 
conditions and imperatives which govern their production and emerge out of social 
relations and circumstances. Discursive and performance strategies consequently 
tend to share many concepts, methods, and historical trajectories. The notion of 
discursive and performance strategies sharpens the concept of episteme by intro-
ducing clear ties to social conditions. For that reason, it is possible for assorted 
(often complementary or mirror-image) strategies to emerge, though frequently 
one is culturally dominant. By the same token, discursive and performance 
strategies are not simply identical and the differences between them cannot be 
dissolved, because the production of (say) novels, philosophy, and plays each 
involves specific conditions and relations that inflect the possible strategies. In 
the analysis that follows, metatheatricality is a performance strategy that arises out 
of particular types of social situations; it results from the specific dynamics of 
certain structural relationships. 
Let me start with a concrete example. One of the richest periods of 
metatheatricality was the Renaissance, and one of the most metatheatrical play-
wrights was Ben Jonson.9 Most of Jonson's comedies, including all the major 
ones, incorporate theatricality as a central motif. Volpone casts himself in several 
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roles, such as the marketplace charlatan and the dying magnifico. So too do the 
swindlers of The Alchemist. Epicoene reveals the title character as a boy masquer-
ading as a woman. Bartholomew Fair starts with a contract between dramatist and 
audience, and ends with a puppet show. Many more examples could be offered. 
Even within English Renaissance drama, Jonson's insistent metatheatricality, the 
sheer weight that he gives it within his dramaturgy, is exceptional. Though often 
laced with antitheatrical sentiment, in Jonson's plays, metatheatricality rises to the 
point of method. 
The example of Jonson offers important clues toward understanding 
metatheatricality in general. It turns out that explaining metatheatricality in Jonson's 
or any other time requires broadening our sights well beyond that period, in order 
to frame appropriate questions for any particular era. 
Jonson's plays have other features closely related to his representations 
of theatricality. Not only does theatricality appear within his plays, Jonson does as 
well: in several plays (such as Every Man Out of His Humour, Bartholomew Fair, 
and The New Inn) he includes a character who is much like himself.10 Jonson's 
strong self-presence also appears in the way his plays were published. At a time 
when plays were considered a "low" form of entertainment, when a gentleman 
seldom admitted to writing and still less to writing for money, Jonson audaciously 
printed his plays and verse under his own name and entitled this collection his 
Works, pronouncing himself an author. In the plays' prefaces and prologues, he 
presents himself through his opinions. Jonson also corrected page proofs and in 
other ways designated his writing for publication. All in all, his use of and control 
over print was unprecedented, and played a notable role in the formation of modem 
authorship. 
Such attention to the dissemination of his writing is a symptom of Jonson's 
concern with language and representation, which appears throughout his writings 
and his attention to publication. On the one hand, Jonson saw himself as introducing 
an artistic discipline and verisimilitude—even a veracity—hitherto unknown in 
English drama. But on the other hand, his attentions to language and representation 
are riddled by deep suspicions. Jonson's discomfort with representation is vividly 
manifested by many of his theatrical and antitheatrical motifs. Characters in disguise 
(such as Volpone and Epicoene) are the occasion for Jonson's revealing in the 
finale a "true" character underneath. In his commonplace book, Jonson attacked 
mimesis itself as inherently dangerous.11 Stanley Fish finds that Jonson's poems 
are self-referential in order to free themselves of representation;12 arguably, his 
plays reflexively represent theatricality in order to attack the theatricality of 
representation. 
The character of Jonsonian metatheatricality can be clarified further by 
comparing it to earlier strategies of self-reflexion, in medieval literature and in 
Shakespeare. Judson Allen contrasts the latter two in a highly suggestive way. 
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Medieval poetry and its interpretation, he argues, operate by "a continual process 
of looking in and looking back—looking at a text itself, and then looking for some 
external similar which will furnish the explanation."13 Medieval texts invoke the 
external world as their referent, double, and completion. But King Lear (like other 
Renaissance texts) offers parallels for the main plot within the play itself, such as 
by drawing similarities between Lear and Gloucester, and between Lear and the 
storm: "everything past the literal sense is in the [play], explicit in the shape of 
events or implicit in the coherences and parallels which the [play] itself creates."14 
Thus Renaissance literature is far more self-contained than its medieval counter-
parts, which must be completed by referring to an external analogue. 
In both cases the texts use a system of doubling to construct meaning, 
above and beyond immediate referentiality. Medieval writing doubled the literal 
meaning of the text with a figural meaning whose locus was outside the text, in the 
natural, cultural, or moral world: text and macrocosm completed each other to 
provide explanation and signification. Theater's performance strategies were 
likewise built upon similitudes and related tropes, such as allegorical characters, 
biblical figures and fulfillments, and trade symbolism. As meanings and references 
multiplied, texts and performances were the subject of interrogation and dialogic 
interpretation. The doubling of the literal plane by figural analogues continued in 
Shakespeare's time, but within the text itself, through subplots, correlates in nature, 
and other devices; the text was becoming a discursive microcosm, needing only 
internal relations for explanation and interpretation. 
Jonson generally eschewed the mirroring of nature and action, plot and 
subplot: he preferred to have the play's literal meaning doubled not by a figural 
meaning, nor by internal analogues, but instead by the play's own manner of 
producing literal meaning—that is, by its being theatrical. Not only are all the 
play's relations internal representationally, they are internal performatively: the 
representations on stage parallel the process of representing on stage. Thus, for 
example, the actor playing Volpone is doubled by Volpone enacting a dying man; 
the wits of Epicoene devise plots and scripts for other characters; the real audience 
is mirrored by an on-stage audience in The Staple of News; a sort of miniature 
playhouse appears in Bartholomew Fair. Virtually the only microcosmic doubling 
in Jonsonian theater is that of theater itself. 
Systems of doubling can be combined—for example, the play Hamlet 
has the doubling of human catastrophes by disturbances in nature, and "The Murder 
of Gonzago," a play-within-a-play. Likewise, Jonson readily utilizes direct 
address to the audience and emblematic characterizations when it suits him. Yet 
what distinguishes Jonsonian metatheatricality from previous forms is its degree 
of internality and self-consciousness. The fact that such different conceptual and 
performance strategies were not considered mutually exclusive was not simply a 
matter of their coexistence, nor really of their compatibility. The social relations 
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of the period gave writers and artists investments in both epistemes, so that despite 
whatever conflicts might exist between these modes of thought, they were often 
imbricated within each other, even used to support each other, in a kind of generative 
tension that (in England) only eased in the latter seventeenth century. 
So far I have identified features of Jonsonian metatheatricality without 
attempting to explain it or even develop much of the context for that activity. 
Those features include the representation of theater within Jonson's plays, the 
more figurative plays-within-plays staged by individual characters, representations 
of Jonson's person, and conflicts over representation itself, including its relation 
to the external world. This sketch should serve to indicate the complex range of 
issues and strategies to which metatheatricality may be related. How do we explain 
the prominence and character of metatheatricality in the Renaissance? How do we 
explain the particularly insistent theatrical and personal self-reflexiveness in 
Jonson's work specifically? What do these things tell us about metatheatricality 
in general, and the relation between theatrical performance and society? 
3 
Analysis of theater and society must be in terms of their ontology—the 
nature and structure of their existence—because they involve not only concepts 
and representations, but also underlying social and cultural forces which change 
and generate change. Forces and their effects need not be perceived in order to 
operate; and if they are, the understanding that results need not be accurate (just as 
one may consider gravity to be "love" or even to be nonexistent, yet it operates the 
same either way). What we experience or represent is only a tiny fraction of what 
actually happens, and what actually happens is the contingent outcome of inter-
actions between the innumerable entities, mechanisms and structures which com-
prise reality, from physics to biology to society to cognition itself. For that very 
reason, we must distinguish between being and knowledge of being. The latter is 
a necessarily fallible effort to identify and understand the former. 
All theories assume some sort of ontology, whether recognized as such 
or not. To put it another way: it is now often argued that there is no such thing as 
a theory-free observation, and therefore we should acknowledge and choose our 
theory. By the same token, however, there is no ontology-free theory, so we should 
recognize which ontology we are using, and improve upon it. The conflation of 
being into knowledge of being—the "epistemic fallacy"—is startlingly common-
place: it appears, for example, in claims that because we can only think and represent 
in signs (discourse, etc.), therefore only signs can be said to exist, and that pulling 
back one layer of signs reveals only a further layer of signs. It is true that perception 
consists of signs, but that is not a limit on existence: all sorts of things are real 
(have causal powers) yet cannot be perceived except indirectly, through their effects. 
Social relations have this sort of reality. Positivists and many poststructuralists 
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have accepted the position that "to be is to be perceived," that only signs or 
experiences can be taken as real. In contrast, the critical realist understanding 
which I am pursuing considers perceptions as the tip of an iceberg, the contingent 
products of real (and often unperceivable) forces and structures, many of them 
social. Identifying such mechanisms and structures is what interests me here, for 
these are the contents of ontology.15 
In speaking of the ontology of society, I have in mind some fairly basic 
distinctions. Recent work in critical realist social theory has shown that social 
dynamics should be analyzed not in terms of a single level (such as individuals, 
collectives, discourses, or practices), nor on two levels (such as individuals and 
society), but on three. One level consists of agents, that is, individuals and organized 
groups, who each occupy various social positions (such as teacher, parent, 
employee) and engage in various practices. Underlying their activities is the level 
of social structures—relationships among people, and between people and material 
resources. These structures condition, constrain, but also enable agents' activi-
ties; they establish the possibilities of action, or more precisely, the system of 
social positions and the practices that make actions possible. Beyond the struc-
tural possibilities of action and the actions which agents actually conduct, there is 
society's third level: the systems of meanings and representations through which 
agents understand and shape their actions and the surrounding circumstances. 
These meanings are organized and articulated in various discourses, not just verbally 
but through signs of any sort. I will call this ontological stratification of society the 
structure/agent/discourse framework. The three tiers each possess sui generis 
powers and autonomies, and they are analytically distinct; yet they do not exist 
separately, and constantly interact with each other.16 
The resolution of society into these three levels can be used in several 
ways. One is in historical analysis, in which one may (for instance) trace the ways 
in which agents act on the basis of society's existing structural, agential, and 
discursive constituents; reproduce and transform each of these; and thereby set the 
stage for the next round of action. Another is in sociological analysis, including 
(among other things) investigating the system of relations that connect various 
structures, agents and discourses, and the manner of their emergence. A third is 
ontological analysis, through which one attempts to determine the manner and 
conditions in which some particular practice or social entity exists. All practices 
involve structures, agents, and discourses; but they involve different specific 
structures, agents, and discourses, and different relationships between them. These 
various approaches may and often must be combined. In the remainder of this 
article, I undertake an ontological analysis of theatrical performance; then I look 
historically at the connection between changes in certain social structures and 
changes in performance strategies leading to metatheatricality. 
Some elaboration on each of the three levels is necessary. Structures in 
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society are social relations and depend primarily on material resources, whether 
physical or human.17 However, insofar as social structures are relationships, they 
are partially conceptual in nature. For example, one form of access to books involves 
the concept of ownership, another form is borrowing from a library, etc. Frequently 
concepts are "embedded" in material products themselves, such as in architecture, 
technological designs, bodily habits, and so forth. Consequently, social structures 
must be understood as being simultaneously material, sociological, and 
meaningful—but with the greatest weight on their material aspect. Two of the 
most important social structures are the economic system and the sex-gender system; 
but there are others, and I will speak of one of them shortly. 
Agents can be individuals, but they can also be organized groups (such as 
a soccer team, a business, a labor union, or a university), for which I'll use the 
phrase "corporate agents." (Groups that are simply categories—like the homeless, 
the retired, or the upper-income bracket—are not corporate agents: their main 
agency is through the uncoordinated but aggregate effects of the individual agencies. 
But it is always possible for them to organize corporate agency, and they may 
actually do so.) All agents, whether corporate or individual, occupy locations 
within the social structure, which establishes a network of positioned practices. 
Agents are central to society because neither social structures nor meaning-systems 
would have come into existence without them. Like structures, agents have material, 
sociological, and meaningful aspects, but their sociological dimension is primary: 
their position and powers within various social relationships, and the interests such 
positions establish, must be considered agents' foremost attributes.18 
One basic capacity attributable to agents is the ability to monitor their 
actions and the results of those actions. This allows them to act selectively in 
order to achieve particular effects. However, this monitoring activity can itself be 
monitored: by "monitoring the monitoring" of their actions, agents generate 
understandings of what they do, producing the meaning-systems which influence 
their intentions and the actions which result. This capacity for reflexive self-
monitoring is a crucial constituent of human agency, and is intimately connected 
to the possession of a sign system.19 Language is the most obvious sign system, 
but it is far from the only one. 
These considerations bring us to society's discursive level. This level 
encompasses not just discursive practices in a general sense, but also specific 
discursive products, such as theories, novels, plays, concertos, dances, and 
sculptures: anything which is primarily communicative or expressive. While 
discursive practices mainly involve meanings, ideas, images, and values, they do 
not simply work upon meanings: they require physical activities such as the 
production of sounds, marks on a page, or paint smears on canvas; and they involve 
interactions between individuals or groups, since they require an audience, though 
that may be oneself. In short, discursive practices too are simultaneously material, 
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sociological, and meaningful, but their meaningful component has the greatest 
weight: the crucial feature of a discourse is the system of logical and/or analogical 
relations it establishes among meanings and representations.20 
In the following analysis, then, the term "discourse" refers to a network 
of meanings and representations possessing (ana)logical relations. However, 
discourses are produced not only through logic and analogy, but also through 
causal procedures creating utterances, texts, etc.; for these causal structures I will 
use the term "communication." Insofar as communication is a material practice, it 
occurs through various "modes": social organizations and developments of speech, 
handwriting, printing, or electronics. Modes of communication are in fact social 
structures, and condition the activities of agents as fundamentally as economics 
and gender. 
Communication is a productive practice. Since communication produces 
various effects, including meanings and interpersonal or social relations, one can 
accomplish things by communicating, or as J. L. Austin put it, "do things with 
words": every speech act, and communication in general, is performative.21 Verbal 
performatives and stage performance have a number of things in common. The 
most important here is that both pertain to the production of meaningful effects. 
They concern production because they generate something new, an array of 
meanings, feelings and sensations in an audience; they concern effects because no 
speech act and no performance can be considered performed unless it achieves 
some effect upon that audience—even if not the one intended.22 Performance, 
then, is a productive practice that aims to produce meaningful effects. This 
definition is intentionally broad, because there are many types of performance, 
and because the concept of performance crosses both discursive and nondiscursive 
practices. These in fact intersect in certain ways—discursive practices affect non-
discursive practices and vice versa, because each possesses material, sociological, 
and meaningful aspects. Thus the production of meaningful effects is only one of 
the ways in which theater and communication possess a common performative 
structure. That commonality will play an essential role in explaining 
metatheatricality; but first we must consider the ontology of theater. 
4 
A good start on theater's ontological structure comes from the Prague-
school semiologist, Jifi Veltrusky, who distinguished between the "acting event," 
consisting of the conventions and relationships governing the interactions between 
performers and audience members; and the "enacted event," the story represented 
or narrated by the performers, the interactions between the characters that they 
perform. As Veltrusky observes, the difference between these two planes can be 
blurred, and some genres of performance make a point of blurring the distinction. 
Nevertheless the two are analytically distinct: the blurring effect derives from close 
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interplay between the two levels, not from an actual disappearance of their 
difference.2 3 
However, theatrical performance possesses a third plane which Veltrusky 
does not consider, consisting of the complex network of ideas and imagery which 
direct, are transformatively concretized in, and/or emerge out of the enacted event. 
The "performance score''' used to produce actions and characterizations may be a 
traditional playtext, but it might be simply a scenario, or even a mere attitude or 
image; it is a "text," but in the broadest sense of the term. The idea here has been 
well expressed by Bert States: "Even in most forms of improvisational theater the 
actor is performing only what he has, in Hamlet's phrase, 'set down' for himself to 
improvise. . . . From the phenomenological standpoint, the text is not a prior 
document: it is the animating current to which that actor submits his body and 
refines himself into an illusionary being." Thus a script in performance is not 
something previous, but rather happens concurrently. Both the performers and 
the audience produce it and use it as material to be worked upon. The third level 
of theatrical performance thus consists of "scripting" in a sense that applies even 
to the images and role-types involved in stage improvisation. It applies also to the 
audience's interpretive activity: for example, spectators may understand the 
movements of (say) geometric figures in an anthropomorphic way, narrativizing 
their behaviors. We may, for convenience, refer to these levels as the theatrical, 
the dramatic, and the scriptive planes of performance.24 
The three planes of performance parallel the three strata of society. The 
theatrical level, which is a system of social relationships between performers, 
audience, and physical resources such as the theater building and the stage, is like 
society's structural level; the characters enacting events on stage are agents of 
sorts; and the script is comparable to society's discursive level. In one sense this 
homology is unexceptional, because all practices involve structures, agents, and 
discourses. This is especially clear for collectively organized practices, that is, 
those of corporate agents, of which a theater company is a type; from this 
perspective, performers are individual agents within a corporate agent, and the 
direct producers of its primary product, the drama (enacted event). A corporate 
agent entails two important features: (1) It organizes individuals toward some end, 
and (2) articulates their interests, goals, or ideas.25 Thus a corporate agent possesses 
an interior structure/agent/discourse framework, which consists of its organizational 
relations, the individuals it comprises (members, employees, etc.), and the dis-
courses it produces for the outside public and for its internal culture. Organizations 
are in effect miniature societies, with a structure/agent/discourse framework in the 
midst of the larger societal structure/agent/discourse framework; but unlike 
societies, organizations are agential in the sense that they can make decisions and 
act upon them. Theater companies similarly reduplicate the structure/agent/ 
discourse framework, and can intervene in social life. 
14 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
However, there is a major difference between theatrical performance and 
society: the agents in the drama (the characters) are fictional, or if you will, virtual. 
They may (perhaps) behave much like real agents, and spectators may respond to 
them in similar ways, but they remain discursive, representational constructs which 
cannot, for example, make decisions within the theatrical organization. The intro-
duction of virtual agents is one aspect of an ontological dislocation resulting from 
two peculiarities of theatrical performance. First, not only is every layer of society's 
structure/agent/discourse ontology implicated (as it is in any practice), every layer 
is doubled. (See Figure 1.) Society's structural level is echoed in the theatrical 
dynamic; real agents find a counterpart in the drama's virtual agents (characters); 
the discursive level is reduplicated in the script. The last doubling is especially 
complex, for ordinary speech acts—performatives—already involve reflexive self-
monitoring. The script, then, performs a monitoring of monitoring-of-monitor-
ing: the performatives of the scriptive level govern and interpret the performatives 
of the dramatic level, forming a new, metadiscursive level of reflexivity. Theatrical 
performance thus consists of discursivized actions of producing discursivized 
actions, the enactment of enactment, the performance of performance. 
Discourses — -— — S c r i p t i v e level 
(Theories, fictions) (Plays, ideas) 
Agents — — - ^ Dramatic level 
(People, their actions) (Characters, plots) 
Structures - — Theatrical level 
(Economics) (Actor/audience relation) 
Figure 1: Theatrical Doublings 
(Examples shown in parentheses) 
The second peculiarity is that theatrical performance not only doubles 
social ontology, it also shifts or rotates it. We might call this aspect of theatrical 
doubling an "ontological shift." (See Figure 2.) The theatrical structure is formed 
by real agents (actors and spectators); that is, agents take the role of structures. 
Within that structure, the virtual agents (characters) act; but they are fictive, the 
products of discourse—discourses take the role of agents. Structures are (repre-
sented by agents, and agents by representations. The "ontological shift" within 
theatrical performance explains how the virtual agents can sometimes displace the 
real agents: the real agents are in a social relation which positions them as part o f 
performance's structure. (The displacement can even involve different bodies, as 
in puppet shows.) But strictly speaking there is no ontological level beyond meaning 
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and discourse; instead, the discursive level is doubled by becoming a system not 
just of signs, but signs of signs—a frequently noted feature of theatrical 
performance.26 (Again, discourse consists not just of verbal signs, but signs of any 
sort.) Due to the systemic nature of its signs-of-signs relation, theatrical performance 
bears a capacity to double the discursive level through a metadiscourse that theorizes 
the underlying conditions of human existence, in whatever manner these may be 
conceived: humans' relations with nature, with god(s), with each other, with their 
own selves, and so forth. In a sense, then, in theatrical performance (meta)discourses 
take the role of underlying structures, and structures form (meta)discourses. The 
circuit connecting metadiscursive activity to fundamental structures of human and 
social existence is completed by the audience, who (like the actors) occupy a struc-
tural position within theatrical performance, yet possess the power to respond 
intellectually, emotionally, and ethically to the drama enacted on stage. The 
audience is part of a "conscious social structure," or better, a virtual structure. 
(Metadiscourses) -^f Scriptive level 
Discourses 
Agents 
Structures 
Dramatic level 
Theatrical level 
(Metadiscourses) 
Figure 2: The Ontological Shift 
Note that theatrical performance doubles the social structure/agent/ 
discourse framework ontologically, not substantively or mimetically. The theatrical 
level (that of performers, stage, and audience) reduplicates the structural level of 
society insofar as both are systems of social relationships establishing positioned 
practices. But the theatrical dynamic need not mirror the dominant social 
relationships, and in fact can differ from them sharply. For example, theater need 
not take a commodity form despite prevailing capitalist relations. Likewise, the 
dramatic characters who pass before the spectators need not behave at all like 
contemporary people, or even like human beings. Nor, finally, must the play's 
discursive content (and potentially its metadiscourse) be familiar, acceptable, 
mimetic, realistic, or even comprehensible. Theater's key likeness to society is 
not a question of imitation or representation, but homology. Whether or not a 
theater performance represents a model of society, ontologically it is a model of 
society. The social situation alone—a performance event with a performed event 
governed by a performance score—makes it so. Naturalism and verisimilitude 
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thus have no privileged capacity to address social reality, and can even obscure it 
by effacing the stratified nature of social ontology. By the same token, stylization, 
strangeness, or even subversiveness in a performance need not limit its potential 
audience. Theatrical performance's doubling of society's ontology, which is 
necessary to all forms of theater, is in principle enough to make it "speak" to the 
participants. 
Theater's character as a doubling of social ontology emerges in other 
ways. In discussing the nature of society's structure/agent/discourse framework, I 
emphasized that agents are the central element: structures and discourses exist 
only by virtue of agents' activities (especially what they have done in the past), 
and can continue or change only through agents' actions and inactions today. Yet 
agents can act in the present only on the basis of the structures and discourses 
given by the past, which provide the conditions and real possibilities for agents' 
activities. In short, if society is understood simply as the structure/agent/discourse 
framework, it will appear static; but once the special position of agency is clear, 
that ontological framework becomes dynamic and sociological analysis is immersed 
in history. 
A similar dynamic exists in theatrical performance. Nothing happens 
without the characters' activities. When they act, the changes they instigate become 
almost unavoidably narrativized, and they are accomplished on the basis of 
structural conditions and discursive directives established within the drama, 
howsoever they may be construed. The characters also act within the parameters 
of the theater's underlying stage/audience relationship, and in relation to discourses 
existing outside the drama as well. With the virtual agents thus nestled dynamically 
within two types of structures and discourses, theatrical performance must be 
understood as being not just a model of society, but also and more specifically, as 
a model of social agency. 
This argument may be viewed as enforcing a character-oriented concept 
of drama. Such a view would be mistaken. Characters do not exist frozen in time: 
they only emerge by virtue of their emplotted activities. Depending on the play 
and the sociohistorical context, they may be (seen as) the masters of their actions, 
or subjects caught within an action driving them ineluctably forward and creating 
them as it presses onward, or some other kind of being. The centrality of virtual 
agents within theatrical performance arises on the theatrical level, but need not 
figure within the drama. Thus even the production of rasas depends on virtual 
agency as transformative praxis. 
Finally, theater doubles society's three ontological levels in a different 
manner at each level. The theatrical level is related to society's structural level, 
the dramatic to the agential level, and the scriptive to the discursive level—but the 
relationship itself differs for each pair. The stage/audience relationship within 
theatrical performance, in all its institutional complexity, is a kind of image or 
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model of the existence of social structures which enable and constrain agency— 
not necessarily a model of any particular social structure (though such may be the 
case), but of what it is to be a social structure. Dramatic acting doubles agency by 
producing virtual agents, which are simultaneously products or causal effects of 
actual agency, causes of action in the dramas, and indexes of what it is to be an 
agent; that is, they point to forms of agency as defined within some society (as do 
methods of dramatic acting, and historical agency itself). This holds true even 
when the characters act like no human ever has on earth: their nonhumanness is 
itself defined by some society, as one of its "negative images" of human agency. 
The script, for its part, constitutes an organization of and comment upon existing 
discourses—that is, the systems of conventionalized signs, each of which is a 
generality (e.g., the word "dog" applies to all dogs) that becomes incorporated 
through the script into a system of higher generalities: again, a system of signs of 
signs; again, generalities that concern the fundamental conditions of human 
existence. 
Discourses ^ 
Symbols (conventionalsigns) 
Agents • 
Indexes 
Structures ^ • 
Icons 
Scriptive level 
Symbolic (conventional) signs of discourses 
Dramatic level 
Indexical signs of agents/agency 
Theatrical level 
Iconic signs of social structures 
Figure 3: Theatrical Doubling as Semiosis 
Thus, the process of ontological doubling in theatrical performance 
involves the construction of an organized representation—in a broad sense, a sign— 
of each level of social ontology, by means of the next level up (structures by 
agents, agents by discourses, discourse by metadiscourse). But the sort of sign 
involved differs at each level: the theater is an icon of structures, dramatic characters 
and actions are indexes of agency, and scripts are (in the Peircean sense) symbols 
of discourse. In fact, the three levels of society's ontology (structure, agent, 
discourse) have a special relationship to each of the three types of Peircean sign 
(icon, index, symbol) respectively.27 (See Figure 3.) Theatrical performance, as a 
double of social ontology, models not only each of the latter's levels, but also the 
modes of semiosis embedded at each level. By the same token, one may say not 
only that the scriptive level consists of signs of (conventional) signs, but also that 
the dramatic level consists of signs of agents (virtual agents) and the theatrical 
level consists of signs of structures (virtual structures). Theatrical performance, 
then, is a complex, partially embodied sign of society. 
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Interpreting theatrical performance as ontological doubling of society 
resolves problems that arise in alternative approaches. Some recent discussions 
focus on repetition in time. For example, Richard Schechner argues that 
"Performance is 'twice-behaved behavior."1 Coming from a different theoretical 
orientation, Judith Butler arrives at a similar conclusion, arguing that "performativity 
must be understood... as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse 
produces the effects that it names.... [I]t is always a reiteration of a norm or set of 
norms."28 The notion of performance as "temporal doubling" encounters difficulties 
in handling improvisation, transformative innovation, and the immediacy of the 
performative act. By grasping the repetition as not a temporal but an ontological 
aspect of performance, those problems do not arise. Moreover, these writers 
(especially Butler) misrecognize the function of the "citing" or "reiteration" that 
necessarily occurs in performance: discourse is performative, and it involves citation 
and citationality, but discourse is not performative because it is citational—it is 
citational because it is semiosic (in particular, because discourse works with 
conventionalized signs). "Performativity," however, is discourse's power of social 
transformation?9 
More traditional arguments maintain that theater is fundamentally mimetic 
or representational. For Bruce Wilshire, for instance, "Theatre i s . . . a perceptually 
induced mimetic phenomenon of participation"; likewise, Eli Rozik argues that 
"theatre is essentially representational."30 This notion of "experiential doubling" 
has the advantage of involving a specific social or discursive relationship between 
theatrical performance and social life, and is in fact closer to the correct analysis. 
But it flounders on the role that representation, referentiality and iconicity play in 
all social practices, and it tends to privilege verisimilitude or aesthetic naturalism 
and mystify the non-empirical. The ontological analysis recognizes the semiosic 
aspect of all social practices and finds that it undergoes an additional degree of 
reflexion in theatrical performance, which "imitates" society not necessarily through 
what it represents, but through how it is structured. 
The analysis I have developed here is most akin to Augusto Boal's view 
that "Theatre is born when the human being discovers that it can observe itself.... 
On stage, we continue to see the world as we have always seen it, but now we also 
see it as others see it: we see ourselves as we see ourselves, and we see ourselves 
as we are seen." Also similar is his assertion that in theater, two spaces—one real, 
the other fictive—occupy the same place at the same time. This dichotomy dichot-
omizes the spectators: "we are here, seated in this very room, and at the same time 
we are in the castle of Elsinore."31 The key difference is that (at least in its current 
state) his analysis of reflexivity is essentialist; my argument, however, firmly plants 
theatrical reflexivity within a theory of social dynamics. 
To hazard another definition, then, theatrical performance is the produc-
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tion of societal reflexivity. Both terms should be glossed. On the one hand, societal 
reflexivity involves reflexivity at each level of social ontology—their doubling 
into the performance event, the performed event, and the performance score. Thus 
the structure of theatrical performance is a model of social ontology; the structure, 
but not necessarily the representations. However, the practice of societal reflexivity 
can only be performed by specific societies—specific in their history and geography 
as well as their social structures and culture. Consequently theaters must be 
understood institutionally, in terms of not just what they perform, but also their 
location, occasion, architectural arrangement, performance styles, and performer 
and audience social categories; all areas which can involve social struggles. (The 
relevance of social specificity to metatheatricality will emerge toward the end of 
this article.) By the same token, the ontology of theatrical performance as a model 
of social ontology enables it to function as a "virtual public sphere" capable of 
presenting alternatives to the dominant social, political, and cultural order,32 but it 
almost inevitably offers representations of some society, whether or not it is one 
that has ever or could ever exist. 
On the other hand, societal reflexivity involves semiosis, or more precisely, 
communication, and so must be performative and dialogic. For that reason, the 
performers and the audience must both be aware of the reflexive character of the 
event, and both must recognize that the being enacting the drama is a virtual agent 
(a character), not a real agent (a person), and so govern their social relationship to 
that being accordingly. Situations in which someone "puts on an act" for unsus-
pecting witnesses, observes people in life as unwitting actors, and similar 
permutations might be described as theatrical in a metaphoric sense, but not in an 
analytic sense. However, since the reflexivity of theatrical performance is societal, 
it constitutes a structural (not simply discursive) reflexivity involving all three 
ontological levels; and there is no reason why discourse must be the most important 
among them, or when it is, that the discourse need be abstract and intellectual 
rather than, say, affective or even sensual. Since the reflexivity of theatrical 
performance is "global," it can engage the audience on numerous levels—the 
reflexive experience of "enjoying themselves," perhaps. We can see, then, that 
while from a formal semiotic perspective, theatrical performance simply produces 
various signs and representations (or better, signs of signs), from the standpoint of 
social ontology something far more complex takes place, which involves the 
doubling of society's overall ontological structure and the creation of a special 
sort of social agent that exists only virtually and only within the confines of the 
drama, and which produces intended and unintended cognitive, emotional and 
sensual effects within the audience. 
The distinction between theatrical performance and other performance 
genres cannot be adequately understood as the presence or absence of some element, 
because the basic elements—structures, agents, and discourses—are the same for 
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all practices. What makes theater unique is the set of social relationships it 
establishes among these basic elements (in particular, its doubling and "twisting" 
of social ontology). The definition of theater belongs on ontological and 
sociological grounds, not on technical, formal, or experiential grounds. Only a 
social definition of theatrical performance can ever achieve an understanding equal 
to its richness, and only if "social" embraces more than discourse. At the same 
time, the fact that theater doubles social ontology illuminates theater's value for 
understanding society: not only do theatrical performances often present images 
of a society (however ideological in character), its very ontology echoes society's. 
5 
Theatrical performance possesses a special relationship to the ontological 
structure of society, but also to a particular social structure: it has multiple 
connections to communication practices. Theatrical performance is a type of 
communication, and communication is performative. Communication in the sense 
of discourse is crucial for the constitution and activity of agents; and the virtual 
agents (characters) in drama are discursive constructs. The reflexive dimension of 
discourse, as the monitoring of monitoring, is reduplicated within theatrical 
performance as the performance of performances, and still more so as the production 
of societal reflexivity. And on the practical level, theatrical performance requires 
communication and often involves a complex relationship between speech and 
writing, a relationship that is defined by and builds upon the complex relationship 
they have within most societies. 
But neither the use and function of a mode of communication nor the 
relationship among modes is stable. Like any other practice, communication 
changes: an existing mode of communication may be used by new people, utilized 
in a new way, lose its previous importance, and so forth; and a new mode of 
communication can be introduced. The effects of such changes in communication 
practices are far more profound than might at first be realized, because the social 
organization of communication creates ground rules for discourse—generative 
principles which govern the production of concepts, shape the basis of their validity, 
and design their relation to the realities they represent. When communication 
practices significantly alter, the old order of representation is put into question. A 
crisis in representation ensues. 
This brings us back to the English Renaissance and the problem of 
Jonsonian metatheatricality. As many studies have attested, there was a crisis in 
representation in Renaissance England. One major cause was the rise of print 
culture, which produced disruptions within and departures from manuscript culture. 
In medieval manuscript culture, books were relatively rare and reading (still more, 
writing) skills were restricted to a small minority forming a sort of literate island in 
an oral sea. Cultural dependance on orality strongly affected uses and 
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understandings of texts, even while texts (especially the Bible) shaped oral culture.33 
With the introduction of printing, slow transformations arose, becoming most acute 
around 1600. Writing could now be produced in two forms—handwritten and 
printed—and as more and more people became readers, writing's relation to oral 
communication changed. Books and pamphlets became increasingly common-
place, they played an ever-greater role in culture and society, and the deepening 
cultural dependence upon them fostered a new standard of textual exactitude and 
systematicity. Educators relied on classical Roman authors to fill their textbooks, 
and as classical writings became more readily available, the humanists used textual 
evidence to discover the historicity and conventionality of language. The legal 
profession began to depend on the publication of case books that allowed citation 
of precedents. Protestants located their spiritual foundations in reading the Bible, 
grasping its words as literal truth, and using the text as the launching point for 
castigating the older, more orally- and ritually-based religiosity and for their own 
self-questioning and introspection. Culture, then, became increasingly text-based. 
This was not solely a matter of a developing print culture, since merchants and 
capitalists found the contract to be the essential model of social relations, and so 
with regard to the growing textual orientation in society, printing and capitalism 
went hand in hand: "print capitalism," in Benedict Anderson's phrase.34 
The Renaissance crisis in representation can be understood as resulting 
from a conflict between the expansion of manuscript culture's old discursive pro-
ducts, and the introduction of print culture's new discursive process. For example, 
the massive growth in mystical and alchemical publications meditating on the 
similitudes between things was opposed by those advocating Baconian notions of 
scientific method and mathematically lucid writing based on a new role for linearity. 
But the dimensions of the Renaissance crisis in representation cannot be gauged 
simply in terms of the old vs. the new, nor product vs. process. The transformation 
in communication practices created a conflict between two discursive orders, two 
different ways to produce and validate knowledge. The complex relations between 
old product and new process probably contributed to the fusions and confusions 
between contrasting or even contradictory epistemes. But such conflicts place a 
question mark over truth: an unavoidable uncertainty arises, an inadequacy or 
absence in knowledge which must somehow be enclosed.35 Knowledge itself 
becomes a problem. Thus we find that Renaissance theorists of drama and poetry 
were preoccupied with issues of knowledge and truth, consequently reviving the 
Horatian call for instructive entertainments, and even arguing (as Castelvetro did) 
that writers must choose subjects and methods that pleased the uneducated. Whether 
as wisdom or ignorance, knowledge was the crux. This is the context for Jonson's 
constant concerns regarding language and representation, and for his pursuit of a 
kind of truth-to-life in his drama. 
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The transition from a manuscript culture to a print culture generated specific 
pressures toward metatheatricality. The medieval strategy of doubling text and 
world, multiplying the referential aspect of discourses, was part of the custom of 
seeing all things as signs authored by God. This strategy gave theater enormous 
power, as its representations had direct applicability for interpreting the world at 
large; but by the same token, the Church constrained the permissible interpretations. 
Print culture displaced the medieval discursive rules asserting bonds between 
culture and nature with rules asserting bonds within culture alone—that is, it replac-
ed referentiality and external relations with conventionality and internal relations. 
The Renaissance strategy of internal doubling emphasized discourses' formal con-
struction and conventions, and their human authorship; interpretations of plays 
increasingly strove to reconstitute authorial intentions. Those developments turned 
plays into self-conscious artifacts of human creation and paved the way for author-
ship to become a prominent cultural function. Though the shift from external to 
internal relations occurred slowly and allowed for epistemic combinations, it 
ultimately provoked a crisis in the social relationship to representation, a crisis 
that highlighted discourses' internality, conventionality, and possession by a 
linguistic community; consequently, representation had to represent representa-
tion. The development of internal discursive relations forced a theatrical 
recognition of theatricality as a conventionalized, contingent mode of representation 
which offered truth through inner coherence. For this reason the focus on the 
problem of knowledge even oriented specific metatheatrical techniques: two major 
usages of the play-within-the-play were to represent the conflict between appearance 
and reality, and to offer a moral or allegorical exemplum.36 
It is easy to see why Jonson was particularly ensnared by the crisis of 
representation, and therefore frequently metatheatrical in his dramaturgy. His 
activity in editing and publishing his plays are just one aspect of his deep 
involvement in early print culture. His extraordinary scholarship, his reliance 
upon printed texts, made him question his knowledge and his theater more than 
most—a questioning that consisted at core of demanding from each its textual 
validation. This authority was ultimately secured through the (implied) presence 
of the author in the performance, declaring his possession of the text's meaning. 
Such possession was encouraged by capitalism but made possible by printing. As 
printing was one of the earliest capitalist enterprises, so too was the printed book 
one of the earliest mass-produced commodities. To have knowledge meant to 
have books on the shelf and in the head. Jonson thus printed his Works and inserted 
himself into his plays as evidence of his authority and mastery over his own 
meaning, the meanings he owned. Renaissance metatheatricality reduplicated the 
figure of the author, and no matter how jocularly or sneeringly Jonson depicted 
that author, the authorial presence was what mattered. The advent of the author 
function thus went hand in hand with the strategy of theatrical self-reflexion.37 
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And by doubling human products with a human process, Jonsonian metatheatricality 
effectively eliminated the lingering power of nature which oral culture posited. 
Creation was an act of authorship, and authorship an act of knowledge and power. 
6 
In contrast to Derrida and Abel, I find that metatheatricality of the type 
appearing in the Renaissance results out of and is contingent upon social forces. 
Discursive reflexivity arose not because of the nature of writing's internal relation 
to speech or some other technological determination, or because of the arbitrary-
development of a style or genre, but primarily because the revolution in 
communication structures generated a need to reconceive discourse within 
discourse. The advent of print capitalism led to writers' political invocation of 
themselves as authorities—even incompetent authorities—over meanings, in 
circumstances where the new mode of communication made older strategies of 
discursive coherence and control uncertain or contested. The search for meaning 
through a text's internal relations and authorial intentions thereby imposed a new 
order of control over discourse and interpretation. 
But that is only part of the explanation. So far I have restricted my 
discussion to the English Renaissance and pointed out some of the unique 
circumstances that fostered metatheatricality then. However, to gain a fuller grasp 
of the dynamics producing metatheatricality, we must recognize that there have 
been other revolutions in communication, such as from an oral to a literate culture, 
and now, evidently, from a print to an electronic culture. Many of the problems 
that arose during the manuscript-to-print revolution of the Renaissance are features 
of all transformations in communication. In particular, they involve a conflict 
between two discursive orders resulting in a crisis in representation marked by a 
gap or lack in knowledge that must somehow be repaired. 
However, a crisis in representation is also a crisis of agency: if discourse 
is crucial to the constitution of agency, a transformation of communication practices 
necessarily disrupts social understandings of agency and action as well as the 
structural conditions for action, thus posing the problem of what to do and how to 
speak—the problems which face Hamlet, who acts mad while trying to decide 
how to act and how to justify that act and who finally ends in silence, and which 
also face Morose (in Jonson's Epicoene), who demands silence and comes to rue 
a decision made most carefully and rationally. In the twentieth century, Beckett, 
Handke and Artaud (among others) worked similar furrows. In short, transformation 
at the structural level of communication induces crises at both the discursive and 
the agential levels. 
That suggests some ways we may refme our concept of performance, 
theater, and metatheatricality. Discourses and social structures both depend on 
the exercise of agency—performance in everyday life, in the sense of conducting 
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meaningful, real actions and interactions. At the same time, agents' activities involve 
discourse, that is, their understanding of, reasons for, and comments upon their 
own activities in the world: reflexive (second-order) monitoring. Such discourse 
necessarily is itself performative: it produces meanings which transform social 
circumstances. Consequently, individual and group agency is constituted in part 
through discursive practices, as is the very concept and nature of agency within a 
given society; thus, for example, the differences between "selfhood" during the 
Middle Ages and the modern era. 
But since discursive strategies are shaped by communication practices, 
changes in the communication framework disrupt the conduct of reflexive self-
monitoring. That historical situation puts the concept and nature of agency into 
question: agents must then monitor the monitoring of monitoring, that is, be 
reflexive about reflexivity. This introduces not just performance in everyday life, 
but a theatricality of everyday life; but not theater in everyday life, since the 
dislocation derived from the ontological shift—the creation of virtual agents 
recognized as such by the audience—does not occur. This theatricality within 
everyday life appears in forms such as Renaissance self-fashioning, or today's 
gender performativity and cultural "styling." Within theater itself (as a model of 
social agency), the shifting of the communication framework generates the need 
for a third level of performativity, in which agents enact the enactment of agency. 
To fill that need, the structure/agent/discourse framework, duplicated in the form 
of theater, must be reduplicated yet again by way of theatrical self-reflexiveness— 
such as the play-within-a-play. Metatheatricality, then, is a way to comprehend 
and perhaps resolve crises in agency, particularly when two (or more) models of 
agency are in contention. 
One would therefore expect metatheatricality to crop up most during major 
alterations in the framework of communication. Metatheatricality is possible at 
other times (various sorts of social change can provoke similar, if less drastic, 
disruptions in the constitution of agency, and the strategy is always available in 
principle), but the need for theatrical self-reflexivity should be greatest during 
radical changes in communication practices. And that seems indeed to be the 
pattern. After the transition to print culture, there is rather little metatheatricality 
during the eighteenth century when communication structures were fairly stable; 
it increases over the course of the nineteenth century under the pressure of economic 
and political upheavals. With the introduction of electric and electronic culture in 
the late nineteenth century, metatheatricality arose in many modernist plays, such 
as Pirandello's Six Characters in Search of an Author, and appeared in various 
sorts of postmodernist performance. But what of the first communications revolu-
tion, the transition into literacy? Classical Greek drama does not offer examples 
of metatheatricality in the form that we find in later epochs. Of course, that was 
the period in which theater (in the narrow sense) was invented, so to that degree it 
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would scarcely be surprising if theater was not yet grasped as a model for the 
structure of social agency. Yet if one considers what was the core model for social 
agency, the form of metatheatricality possible for Greek performance quickly 
becomes apparent. The genre most concerned with agency was religious ritual, 
which we find represented in many Greek tragedies—represented, but not in fact 
performed. 
But this difference in forms of theatrical self-reflexivity points to issues 
which deepen the historicity of metatheatricality. For ancient Greek religious ritual 
was itself a historical form that emerged from a certain set of material and social 
conditions, most notably the society's dependence upon oral culture and hence 
upon embodied memory.38 The rise of literacy within the ascendent mercantile 
and artisanal classes in Athens ruptured oral culture. The situation fused two 
different tendencies in conceptualizing agency into a tense, unstable, temporary, 
but also highly energizing compromise. On the one hand, oral culture posited 
ultimate agency among the gods, before whose interventions mortals were 
fundamentally helpless, aided only through religious rituals and support from a 
god. On the other hand, democratized literate culture tended to generate a notion 
of individual human will and responsibility, regulated by written laws and judgment 
in a court. Together, these two perspectives fused into a notion of human 
participation in the divinities' deeds—a notion exemplified in Oedipus Tyrannos, 
or in the dictum of Heraclitus, cethos anthrdpodaimm (equally translated as "one's 
character is one's lot," or "one's lot is one's character"). Theatrically, the ritual-
based concept of agency also fostered a representation of agents through masks, 
since their primary feature was not their inner depth but their external relations in 
terms of social status and divine (dis)favor; but the literate-based concept of agency 
motivated the creation of individualized protagonists and interlocutors—indeed, it 
stimulated the very notion of the actor on stage. The chorus in turn slowly lost its 
dramatic functions.39 But the embedding of literate and oral concepts of agency 
also appears in Greek theater's institutional structure, in which the theater—a 
fundamentally voluntarist practice—occurred within the ritual context of the annual 
Festival for Dionysus; but interestingly, that festival was itself an invention, roughly 
coeval with tragedy Thus were orality and literacy embedded within each other in 
classical Athens. 
All this indicates three things. First, the relationship between the stage 
actor as real agent and the character as virtual agent is governed by a concept of 
agency. From there, such discourses can become embedded in agents' practices 
and institutional arrangements, and may ultimately affect the very social structures 
from which the concepts originally emerged. The "movement" from structures 
through agents to discourses is succeeded by one from discourses through agents 
to structures, in multiple overlapping cycles that constitute the reflexive transforma-
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tional process of human history. Hence the suggestion that metatheatricality may 
help to resolve crises in agency is more than notional: it is a palpable potentiality. 
Second, concepts of agency arise on the basis of communication structures 
not alone, but in relationship to other structures, among them economics, which 
also conditions the formation of theatrical institutions (as corporate agents).40 The 
specific circumstances under which societal reflexivity occurs (its time, place, 
methods, persons, and social relations) are consequently critical for the historical 
formation of metatheatricality. 
Third, when the model of agency changes, so too must the nature and 
structure of metatheatricality. Thus the oxymoronic "rituals of individual will" 
recurring throughout classical Greek drama became self-reflexive through a ritual 
of individual will at another level. When the archaic ritual basis of the Furies' 
claim on a parricide is displaced by a human court in The Oresteia, the new ritual 
is invented at the behest and with the participation of a god. And the "little play" 
within The Bacchae, in which Dionysus dresses up Pentheus to see and be the 
greatest performance of his life, similarly makes a human participate with a god in 
making a ritual out of his individual agency. In classical Greece, then, 
metatheatricality—if that is the best word here—consists of the individual 
ritualizations of ritualized individualities. 
From this perspective it is clear that the need to contain absences in 
knowledge and govern ambiguities in interpretation need not be met in the way 
that it was during the Renaissance, by imposing the author as the source and final 
arbiter of meaning, and making the discourse's internal relations primary. That 
strategy was motivated in part by capitalism. Theatrical practice was becoming 
not merely voluntarist, but professional. Where classical Greek and, somewhat 
differently, medieval theater were basically voluntarist institutions within ritual 
frameworks, most Renaissance theater contained theocentric ritual within an 
anthropocentric institutional framework. Not only was ritual (and the ritual of 
individual will) interiorized, the will was as well. Henceforward, characters would 
increasingly possess inner psychological depth, which was largely a product of 
print culture. (And casting moved toward a one-to-one relationship between actors 
and characters, a standard finally established around the mid-seventeenth century.) 
The interiority of agents opened the possibility of "metatheatre" as a genre of self-
dramatization. More importantly, however, theater increasingly replaced its ritual 
aspects with representational functions, a shift that corresponded to the move from 
similitudes to verisimilitude. That too resulted from print culture—among other 
reasons, because beings and events once interpreted according to a natural and 
social order forged by God now increasingly had to be seen strictly through the 
eyes of an individual human. The theatrical representation of theatrical 
representation thus formed the play within the play, allowing the source, center, 
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and control of meaning to be situated within individual authorship. 
Metatheatricality has essentially remained in this mode throughout print 
capitalism: in effect, an entrepreneurial representation of representational 
entrepreneurship. Thus we find the plays concerned with theater as a profession 
and as a cultural agent (described by Nelson and Newey) as the norm of meta-
theatricality during that era. The nineteenth-century emphasis on the actor as 
opposed to the theater institution does constitute a shift (encouraged, no doubt, by 
the advent of the star system, among other things), but it is a shift within the overall 
framework which makes metatheatricality concern the character of theatrical agents, 
whether they are corporate or individual—a concern that can even shift the play-
within to an offstage event. That concern is consistent with the era's empiricism 
and positivism, which conceived of reality in terms of discrete units acting under 
the compulsion of external (mechanistic) or internal (organic) laws of behavior, in 
effect limiting the ontological gaze to the level of agents alone.41 To that extent 
the nineteenth century's plays about theater are little different from its plays about 
stock speculation, prostitution, or poor-but-honest Irishwomen: theater is just one 
in a field of individual and corporate agents. 
During the transition era of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
however, the play-within was often a stratagem chosen by a character in order to 
act, in contrast to an expression or instance of character. It was not something an 
agent does so much as a way of doing agency. As a result, the inner play generally 
had strong thematic and/or functional connections to the outer play, aiming to 
affect the onstage audience in some way. Such connections were encouraged by 
the decaying but still active medieval orientation toward external relations. 
(Interestingly, the plays chosen as stratagems or entertainments, such as "The 
Murder of Gonzago" in Hamlet or Bartholomew Fair's puppet-show, often involve 
a type of theater that is outdated or disreputable, suggesting an effort to contain or 
supplant an old or problematic form of agency with a new form that the outer play 
already institutes; or less often, as a gesture toward a classicist restoration.) 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, with communication practices 
again transforming, plays-within-plays returned as a model and mode of agency. 
But another form of metatheatricality also became prominent: theatrical self-
reference. I am using this term in a narrow sense: not the broad notion of reference 
to or representation of some theater or convention generally, but rather, specific 
reference to the present performance. As Hornby notes, such self-referentiality 
has appeared (and disappeared) most often during the same eras as the play-within-
the-play, though it is even more uncommon;42 but while it arises in various eras, I 
think it is no accident that his most extensive examples of self-reference come 
from the twentieth century: on the one hand, the technique extends the principle of 
internal relations yet one step further, in a manner consistent with the further socio-
logical specialization and compartmentalization of artists and intellectuals and their 
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concomitant formation of competing avant-gardes; on the other, the increasingly 
obvious role of large sociopolitical forces in everyday life has attuned a segment 
of that group to questions of social and artistic process. 
There are three basic ways in which theater can refer to itself, 
corresponding to its ontological levels and consequently involving distinctive 
concepts of agency. Modern forms of self-reference once again make theatrical 
performance a method of doing agency, but each in a different way and to a different 
degree. The first refers to the theater as an institution, a corporate agent possessing 
particular goals, strategies, resources and roles. Characters may refer to the conven-
tions of theatrical performance, whether as drama or as professional activity, perhaps 
showing the events on stage to be mere dramatic illusions. This approach is a kind 
of offshoot of nineteenth-century plays-within-plays focusing on actors and 
dramatic art, and as such appears in Ibsen's Peer Gynt, when a character reassures 
the ne'er-do-well that he needn't worry since nobody ever dies in the middle of 
the last act (a moment which revives the theatrical gesture toward the author). 
Another example is Thornton Wilder's Our Town, with its stage manager conducting 
the theatrical representation of small-town scenes. Self-reference of this sort serves 
as a sort of knowing wink to the audience, ensuring its complicity in a system of 
fixed identities.43 It is essentially a further development of "professionalistic" 
metatheatricality. 
An extreme instance of this first approach, bridging toward the second, 
occurs in Pirandello's "trilogy of theater in theater," especially Six Characters. In 
these plays, if the events in the inner play are mere dramatic illusions, so are those 
in the outer play and potentially in everyday life as well, and members of the 
audience are scarcely more substantial than characters who "literally" come to life 
in order to play out their drama. Identities are unstuck, but they are reduced to 
theatrical types and (melo)dramatic stereotypes, not dispersed altogether. 
In its anthropocentrism, its focus upon perceptions and on regularities of 
behavior, and in other ways, "professionalistic" theatrical self-reference is 
fundamentally positivistic; not surprisingly, the two other approaches have ties to 
forms of antipositivism. The second form of self-reference focuses on performance 
as discursive, a system of signs and representations referring in the end only to 
other signs and representations which (according to this view) constitute social 
life in an unending process of semiosis, without an underlying reality. Self-
referentiality here is less a technique than a principle, an inevitability. Agency is 
dispersed into discourse: it is a cipher produced by and caught within discourse's 
self-weaving webs. This is the approach adopted in postmodernism, recently and 
vividly exemplified by the music video of Bjork's "Bachelorette," a tour de force 
of discursive self-reference in which Bjork's character, digging in a forest, finds a 
blank book which begins to write itself, creating a narrative which she enacts as 
she reads. The book functions as a script, which Bjork's character performs not 
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just in the theater of life, but in theatrical re-stagings of those same events—unlike 
the traditional play-within-a-play, discursive self-reference incorporates itself not 
just generically, but literally (that is, as a reiteration or quotation), so that the inner 
play is largely identical to the outer play. In the "Bachelorette" video, when the 
recursive process reaches the point of theater-within-theater-within-theater (within 
video), the performative cycle begins to unravel: the book erases itself while the 
inner theaters are consumed by the sinuous, mute greenery from which the entire 
sequence began, and just at the moment when, forced onward by its incessant 
discursive self-production, the performance would enter a still further level of 
self-reflexiveness, it crumbles into vegetation and in a sense (re)turns itself into a 
natural state.44 
The sheer literalness of discursive self-reference can take the opposite 
path, not toward infinite recursions, but toward total reduction into the actors' and 
audience's consciousness of performance. Handke uses this tactic in Offending 
the Audience. The multiple layers of theatrical performance seem (but only seem) 
to collapse into present speech acts, as the speakers alternately characterize, curse, 
and compliment their audience. This theatrical implosion into what is actually 
present at the moment of performance might, aesthetically speaking, be called a 
style of ultra-naturalism. 
Fascinating and suggestive as such performances are, discursive self-
reference (like agential self-reference) treats agency as involving only one 
ontological level. Much more radically, however, theatrical self-reference can 
occur not discursively, but performatively, so that the production of meaningful 
effects refers to and hence reveals the production of meaningful effects.45 In this 
performance strategy, theater refers to itself not so much as an agent or a discourse, 
but as a productive structure. More exactly, theater's structure/agent/discourse 
framework refers to and reveals itself as a structure/agent/discourse framework, 
and it does so primarily through the activity of the actors and director (and need 
not conduct theatrical self-reference via the characters at all). The difference here 
is subtle but crucial: the performance refers to the theater/drama/script structure of 
theatrical performance not institutionally—treating theater as one agent among 
many—but ontologically, as a model of social agency itself. Thus agents are under-
stood as being both distinct from and conditioned by preexisting structures and 
discourses, which then are reproduced and/or transformed as the (generally 
unintended) outcomes of agents' intentional and embodied activities. This form 
of self-reference radically expands the critical potential inherent in theatrical 
reflexiveness. Theater becomes a mode of self-reflexivity not just about theater, 
but about the very structure of society, suggesting its performative, transforma-
tive, and hence transformable nature. 
The best-known proponent of self-referential metatheatricality of this type 
is Brecht. Reflexivity regarding social structures is the aim of his most crucial 
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performance strategies, particularly estrangement and distanciated acting. The 
latter, for example, concerns the need to keep the actor from "disappearing" into 
the character, so that (to use the terms developed here) real agents in theatrical 
performance are not entirely displaced and hidden by virtual agents. Such 
distanciation contrasts with acting styles which aim for the disappearance of the 
actor within the character, the real agent within the virtual agent; a disappearance 
that is tantamount philosophically to the collapse of ontological strata into a single 
plane of perception. By keeping both sorts of agents evident, Brecht would reveal 
theater's doubled structure/agent/discourse ontology. Since actors are not the only 
agents involved in theatrical performance, exposing theater's structure/agent/ 
discourse framework exposes the role of the audience in that performance, inviting 
self-reflexivity on its part. Probably the most thorough-going effort along these 
lines remains Weiss's Marat/Sade, which conjoins Brechtian self-referentiality 
with a play-within-a-play. 
But Weiss's play also suggests the fragility of this strategy, which remains 
within the cultural and political structures of aesthetic autonomy and 
professionalism. The strategy unavoidably depends on voluntarist and individ-
ualist commitments by the performers (and the characters-as-performers, for the 
play-within) and by the audience, which ultimately are coordinated hierarchically 
in accordance with the script and an authorial or directorial intention. Should any 
of these commitments not be secured, the strategy generally fails. Another form 
of theater founded on roughly the same concept of agency removes this concern 
by abandoning the institution of professionalistic performance. In particular, it 
shatters the social and architectural division between actor and audience, turning 
all participants into "spect-actors" who may watch a scene and then assume a role 
within it, altering that character's actions. That is the basic goal of Boal's forum 
theater, and of a whole strand of community-based performance in which a group 
of people utilize theater directly as a way to reflect and potentially act upon situations 
in their own lives. The process fosters a dialogic reintegration of intellectual 
producers and recipients (and implicitly or explicitly, of mental and manual labor) 
and a reintegration of art with society, and so community-based performance 
constitutes a kind of anti-avant-garde.46 In this type of performance, the inner play 
is a brief, "Active" structure/agent/discourse framework referring to the real structure 
in which the participants find themselves. Such performance involves self-
referentiality in the sense that the participants reflect on their performances, but 
with an eye for its reflexion into performance in everyday life rather than 
professionalistic issues of doing theater. It is self-referential insofar as it implicitly 
raises the question of the conditions and possibilities of enactment; it may even be 
said to position the real world as its outer stage. 
As did the play-within-a-play during the Renaissance, these various forms 
of theatrical self-reference focus upon a problem or fracture within knowledge 
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(that is, within the dominant discursive order), and a need for a new order that can 
overcome that absence. Though I must discuss this in only the briefest terms, the 
basic contours of each conflict are clear.47 The crisis during the Renaissance had 
as its background the late medieval discourse of patterning and similitudes 
interpretable only by infusing any given discursive product with references to 
words and things outside it. This discursive order elaborated an ontology in the 
form of mystical metaphysics and theocentrism. In the Renaissance, against the 
revelation of truth through divine correspondences, there arose the possibility of 
human discovery of hidden truths via instrumental controls upon the empirical 
realm. The conflict between the two orders hinged on the nature and role of 
perception. During the struggle to make knowledge literally come to its senses, 
performance strategies sought the exposure of plots and the disclosure of mistaken 
identities, the shimmering peek-a-boo between putting on and pulling off masks 
and disguises, the play-within-a-play as a stratagem to release knowledge in its 
coy absence. In the end, the similitudes gave way to verisimilitude, external to 
internal relations, ontology to epistemology. The ultimate outcome of this struggle 
was a discourse of experimentalism and psychological verity in which, as Descartes 
asserted, only what was absolutely certain could be accepted as true. The different 
candidates for such certainty—innate ideas, empirical sense data, even sign 
systems—all circulated around one or another meaning of "perception." Perception 
became the litmus test of existence; at the most extreme, it was existence itself: 
cogito ergo sum. 
In the twentieth century, the tables have turned: the empirical realm is 
assumed, and the problem has become the very relation between the cogito and 
the sum—that is, the relation not between perceptible appearance and reality, but 
between thought and material being. Such fractures in the epistemic legacy are 
everywhere: it finds itself schizophrenically viewing agency as accountable for 
everything and/or capable of nothing; it makes experimentation the groundwork 
of science, yet it cannot adequately theorize the significance or implications of 
that practice; despite according pride of place to causation, its notion of causality 
in fact treats "laws of nature" as though nature behaves quite literally by laws of 
logic; even when it seems most adamantly to insist on the existence of a reality 
outside the mind, it persistently conflates being with knowledge of being; and it 
surreptitiously generates a self-division between itself and various subjectivisms, 
relativisms, idealisms and romanticisms which believe themselves to be its mortal 
enemy when in truth they are but its mirror images, its doppelgangers, its self-
reflexions. All of these cracks stem from a single faultline: the spectre haunting 
knowledge is the question of ontology. 
Confronted by the patent inadequacy of empiricism, the efforts to supplant 
it again revolve around problems of knowledge—this time, the relation between 
knowledge and existence. We have seen the three major options within theater. 
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One approach, encompassing both the infinite regress of performance containing 
itself and self-deconstruction, coils knowledge into its own circle so that it cannot 
escape, like a Mobius strip ever discovering itself on the other side of itself as it 
runs away toward itself: being collapses into knowledge of being. Other strate-
gies, as in the Handke example, embark on the degree zero of performance that 
delimits knowledge into present actualities: the converse of the former approach, 
knowledge is compulsively determined by being. In the final analysis, these 
approaches share empiricism's anthropocentric assumption that "[discourse] is 
the measure of reality." Discourse captures the spectators within itself, because— 
or so that—it and they have no place else to go, and all we can know is the discourse 
we already have.48 
But these are not the only alternatives to empiricism: the order of 
perception may be sundered by the transformative process through which we come 
to understand something. For the Brechtian actor and spectator (when achieved), 
and still further, for the spect-actors of forum theater, knowledge is never a given: 
it emerges through human efforts upon a world that resists being the mind. This 
can only occur, however, if a stratified ontology is acknowledged as the condition 
on which knowledge has any possibility of emergence. Thought and being, 
epistemology and ontology, must be distinct, non-identical, irreducible. 4 9 
Knowledge is unable to provide its own truth through purely internal relations; it 
is fallible, contingent, tentative. It is a question mark in dialogue with existence. 
For all these differences, however, the new performance strategies do 
have a commonality. Where the post-Renaissance era replaced medieval similitudes 
with verisimilitude, these recent modes of performance produce not a verisimilitude, 
but rather perform a model of existence. Endless self-reference, for example, enacts 
a discursivized universe. Moreover, these models point to social elements 
(discourse, structures) as the cornerstones of society's existence and the touch-
stones for interpretation. We might describe these performance strategies as social 
modeling of societal models. But whereas Brecht and Boal are cognizant of their 
performative modeling and its assumptions and implications, postmodernist 
performance strategies can coherently sustain neither the significance nor the rele-
vance of the modeling relations they embody, for a model is necessarily a model 
of something else, a something else that motivates the model and enables us to 
understand things outside discourse. In other words, those strategies secrete an 
implicit ontology even if they explicitly repudiate any such thing. As Bhaskar 
maintains, "Ontology—and realism—are inexorable. The crucial questions in 
philosophy are not whether, but which." These latter modes of performance are 
ensnared in a performative contradiction.50 
A final point about (metatheatricality is spotlighted by the dynamics of 
community-based performance. As I observed earlier, agents are the central element 
of social ontology: nothing happens without agents' activity. For this reason the 
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three levels of social ontology constantly interact as people reproduce and transform 
each of them. The same holds true in theatrical performance—within an institution 
that forms a model of social agency, the theatrical, dramatic, and scriptive levels 
necessarily interact with each other. The play-within-the-play as an agent's 
stratagem makes this especially clear, for it is crucial that the inner play elicits a 
response from the inner audience. Consequently, plays using this device emphasize 
the inner audience's behavior (as in Hamlet) or even their misbehavior (as in 
Jonson's The Staple of News). Likewise community-based performance rejects 
the notion of the audience as passive consumers, and instead seeks to recognize— 
indeed, maximize—their agency. In other words, it addresses the inner audience 
not solely as part of a virtual (theatrical) structure, the "conscious social structure" 
that I described earlier, but as agents. 
It hardly seems coincidental that Brecht obtained some of his ideas from 
Piscator's work with motion pictures, that he wrote radio plays, and occasionally 
performed his own poetry; nor that Boal made some of his crucial innovations in 
the course of his involvement in a literacy campaign, that is, by working with 
modern oral cultures, and that his projects tend to de-emphasize playtexts. It appears 
then that both the rise of new modes of communication and aspects of class-based 
political activism are involved in these theatrical innovations. All of this, however, 
preceded computer-based communication. How that may affect theater is 
impossible to predict, since so much depends upon how we use and organize it. 
But in whatever way it develops, theatrical performance will continue to embody 
concepts of agency, and so to enact for society theories of society itself. 
7 
[J]ust as a social science without a society is impossible, so a 
society without some kind of scientific, proto-scientific, or 
ideological theory of itself is inconceivable. 
—Roy Bhaskar51 
Like Brecht, theater's historians and theorists cannot get along without 
using one or two sciences. Knowledge of society's ontological stratification into 
structures, agents and discourses, knowledge about the interaction between these 
levels, and knowledge of particular structures such as the framework of 
communication practices, the economic system, and sex-gender relations, provide 
theater scholars with crucial tools for understanding the nature and development 
of performance. In this circumstance there lies at least one irony. Theater appears 
to be all about producing appearances, spectacular displays, fascinating surfaces; 
but its real mode of existence, its performative process, is all about depth and the 
operation of underlying structures. Understanding theatrical performance, then, 
requires abandoning the generally prevailing concept of the world, which holds 
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that experiences, surfaces, or representations occupy the whole of what exists; 
that, as the "empiricist" Bishop Berkeley put it, "to be is to be perceived"; that all 
is just a show. 
Acknowledgments 
Special thanks go to Pirkko Koski and the University of Helsinki for 
providing the occasion and a thoroughly congenial atmosphere for writing this 
article. Thanks also to Bruce McConachie, Hanna Suutela, and Mark Weinberg 
for commenting on drafts; to Freddie Rokem and Tel Aviv University, Liisa 
Saariluoma and the University of Turku, and Svein Gladso and the Norwegian 
University for Science and Technology for opportunities to present various lecture 
versions; and to Judith Milhous, for a conversation long ago. I would also like to 
express my gratitude for a 1996-97 fellowship from the American Council of 
Learned Societies and for a 1997-98 Fulbright lectureship at the University of 
Helsinki, without which this article would not have been possible. 
Spring 2000 35 
Notes 
1. Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theater, trans. John Willett (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1964) 73. 
2. Dieter Mehl, "Forms and Functions of the Play Within a Play," Renaissance Drama 
o.s., 8 (1965): 41-61; Richard Hornby, Drama, Metadrama, and Perception (Lewisburg: Bucknell 
UP, 1986); Robert J. Nelson, Play Within a Play—The Dramatist's Conception of His Art: Shake-
speare to Anouilh (New Haven: Yale UP, 1958). 
3. Lionel Abel, Metatheatre: A New View of Dramatic Form (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1963) 64,77-78,101,113; and see Judd D. Hubert, Metatheater: The Example of Shakespeare (Lincoln: 
U of Nebraska P, 1991). 
4. Victor Shklovsky, "Sterne's Tristram Shandy: Stylistic Commentary," Russian Formalist 
Criticism: Four Essays, trans. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1965) 
25-57; Boris Tomashevsky, "Thematics," Russian Formalist Criticism 61-95. 
5. Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy," in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: 
U of Chicago P, 1981) 158. See also Derrida's analyses of Rousseau and Saussure in Of Grammatology, 
trans. Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976). 
6. Nelson 89-90. 
7. {Catherine Newey, "Melodrama and Metatheatre: Theatricality in the Nineteenth Century 
Theatre," Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 12.1 (Spring 1997): 87. 
8. Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language, trans. 
A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972) 193-94. 
9. I use the term "Renaissance" somewhat reluctantly, but it seems the best choice, since 
Jonson wrote during both the Elizabethan and Jacobean reigns, and because I am discussing the 
historical transition period cresting at about 1600. 
10. See David Riggs, Ben Jonson: A Life (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1989), 59-60; 
Richard Helgerson, Self-Crowned Laureates: Spenser, Jonson, Milton, and the Literary System 
(Berkeley: U of California P, 1983) 132-39; and Alexander Leggatt, Ben Jonson: His Vision and 
His Art (London: Methuen, 1981) Chap. 6. 
11. Jonson, Timber, or Discoveries, in Ben Jonson, ed. C. H. Herford, Percy Simpson, 
and Evelyn Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925-52), vol.8, lines 1093-98. 
12. Stanley Fish, "Authors-Readers: Jonson's Community of the Same," Representations 
7 (1984): 34-35. 
13. Judson Boyce Allen, The Ethical Poetic of the Later Middle Ages: A Decorum of 
Convenient Distinction (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1982) 150. 
14. Allen 151. The original sentence refers to The Faerie Queene; Allen then extends his 
comparison to Lear and Hamlet. 
15. The best defense of ontology to date is Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Knowledge 
(Sussex: Harvester Press; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1978). The term "epistemic 
fallacy" is his. For a discussion of critical realism's application to theater history, see my "Science, 
History, Theater: Theorizing in Two Alternatives to Positivism," Theatre Journal 45 (1993): 505-27. 
36 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
16. Using somewhat different terms and a not-altogether explicit analysis, the three-
leveled conception of social ontology is developed in Margaret S. Archer, Realist Social Theory: The 
Morphological Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995). Archer also develops a highly valuable 
analysis of how the levels interact. I attempt to define the three levels more explicitly and to clarify 
the role of signs and representations within social ontology in "Signs, Social Ontology, and Critical 
Realism," Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 28.1 (1998): 13-21. 
17. Archer 175-79. 
18. "Agents" should not be simply identified with "people": as Archer points out, the 
latter have all sorts of characteristics, such as hair color and birth dates, but only some of these pertain 
to people's social position and their intentionality. The phrase "corporate agent" is also Archer's. 
See Archer 248-93. 
19. Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the 
Contemporary Human Sciences, 2nd ed. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989): 35, 81-82. I have 
adopted Bhaskar's choice of the term "monitoring"; a few respondents to a draft of this paper have 
understood it to mean something like "scrutiny" or "surveillance " but all that is necessary is the 
weaker, even desultory sense of "checking and being aware of." 
20. The material, sociological, and meaningful aspects of each level of society's ontological 
structure is where my analysis draws close to the one developed by Alice Rayner, To Act, To Do, To 
Perform: Drama and the Phenomenology of Action (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994). This book 
develops a fundamentally phenomenological analysis, in contrast to my ontological one. 
21. J. L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1962). Note, every 
speech act: in some quarters Austin is thought to retain a distinction between performatives and 
constatives, but that interpretation ignores the burden of the last two lectures, in which the distinction 
dissolves into an issue of illocutionary force (Austin 133-64). "Constatives," one might say, are a 
species of performative. 
22. As is well-known, Austin dismissed theatrical speech as "parasitic" upon ordinary 
speech acts (22); I think Derrida's critique is adequate. Darko Suvin (in correspondence) has objected 
to the adoption of Austin's concept for theater and performance studies, arguing that Austin could 
very well have called his notion "executivity." But in my view, what unites the Austinian and the 
theatrical concepts of the performative are their productive character and their emphasis upon the 
generated outcome or effect, whereas the verb "to execute" stresses the intentions which precede the 
action and the degree to which the action is consistent with those intentions. 
23. Jifi Veltrusky, "Contribution to the Semiotics of Acting," in Sound, Sign and Meaning: 
Quinquagenary of the Prague Linguistic Circle, ed. Ladislav Matejka (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic 
Contributions, 1976) 577-78. 
24. Bert O. States, Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: On the Phenomenology of Theater 
(Berkeley: U of California P, 1985) 128. See also my "Performance, Hegemony, and Communication 
Practices: Toward a Cultural Materialist Analysis " Theatre Annual 49 (1996): 6-7. The traditional 
playtext may thus be paradigmatic of the scriptive level, but it is clear that even in the most conservative 
text-based performance, the playtext is never the only source of scriptive imagery and ideas. 
25. Archer 185-86, 258-65. 
Spring 2Q00 37 
26. Here another link between theater and communication appears, since the signs-of-
signs structure of theatrical performance is akin to that of phonetic writing. There may also be a 
historical relation between the two: see my "Literacy, Tyranny, and the Invention of Greek Tragedy," 
Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 3.2: 53-71 (1989). 
27. Nellhaus, "Signs" 20. 
28. Richard Schechner, Between Theater and Anthropology (Philadelphia: U of Pennsyl-
vania P, 1985) 36; Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (New York: 
Routledge, 1993) 2, 12; Judith Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution," Theater Journal 
40 (1988): 519-31. 
29. Social actions do of course often repeat or invoke previous actions, and so accomplish 
similar acts which reproduce underlying social relations, but events are not (textual) citations. Though 
Butler constructs her notion of "performativity" upon Derrida's analysis of speech act theory in 
"Signature Event Context," LimitedInc (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1988) 1-23, Derrida himself 
does not commit the error of collapsing performativity into citationality. In fact, he never refers to 
"performativity" at all, only to "performatives" and "performative utterances"—that is, speech acts 
themselves. (Interestingly, the phrase "speech acts" connects these two facets of language: speech as 
a system of signs, and acts as exertions of social agency.) Butler's confusion of discourse's social 
dynamic with its semiotic mechanism constitutes a "linguistic fallacy" (the assimilation of being into 
language), which is a variant of the "epistemic fallacy" (the definition of being in terms of knowledge) 
and a form of destratification. Once the social is equated with (or viewed as wholly determined by) 
discourse alone, the confusion between performativity and citationality is not only inescapable, but 
invisible. 
30. Bruce Wilshire, Role Playing and Identity: The Limits of Theatre as Metaphor 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1982) 26; Eli Rozik, "Theatre at One of Its Borderlines: Reflections on 
Suz/o/Suz by La Fura dels Baus," Theatre Annual 49 (1996): 93. 
31. Augusto Boal, The Rainbow of Desire: The Boal Method of Theatre and Therapy, 
trans. Adrian Jackson (London: Routledge, 1995) 13, 22-23, 26. 
32. Cf. Loren Kruger, The National Stage: Theatre and Cultural Legitimation in England, 
France, and America (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992) 11-17. 
33. I have explored an example of this in "Mementos of Things to Come: Orality, Literacy, 
and Typology in the Biblia pauperum" in Printing the Written Word: The Social History of Books, c. 
1450-1520, ed. Sandra Hindman (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UP, 1991) 292-321. 
34. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), passim. The link between printing and capitalism in 
Europe is discussed in Lucien Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin, The Coming of the Book: The Impact of 
Printing, 1450-1800, ed. Geoffrey Nowell-Smith and David Wootton, trans. David Gerard (London: 
Verso, 1976) 37-44, 109-27, 224-44. 
35. Cf. Timothy J. Reiss, Tragedy and Truth (New Haven: Yale UP, 1980) 11 and passim. 
36. Mehl, passim. 
37. On willful, possessive, knowledgeable selfhood, see Timothy J. Reiss, The Discourse 
of Modernism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UP, 1982). On Jonson's use of print, see Joseph Loewenstein, 
38 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
"The Script in the Marketplace," Representations 12 (1985): 101-14; Timothy Murray, Theatrical 
Legitimation: Allegories of Genius in Seventeenth-Century England and France (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), chaps. 2-5; Richard Helgerson, Self-Crowned Laureates: Spenser, Jonson, 
Milton, and the Literary System (Berkeley: U of California P, 1983) chap. 3; and Richard C. Newton, 
"Jonson and the (Re-)Invention of the Book," in Classic and Cavalier: Essays on Jonson and the 
Sons of Ben, ed. Claude J. Summers and Ted-Larry Pebworth (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1982), 31-55 
38. On ritual as embodied memory, see Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989) 54, 57-59. I should note that I am referring in this discussion 
strictly to religious ritual, not to ritual in general. 
39. Jean-Pierre Vernant, "Tensions and Ambiguities in Greek Tragedy" and "Intimations 
of the Will in Greek Tragedy," Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre 
Vidal-Naquet, tr. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone Books, 1988) 29-48,49-84; Joel D. Schwartz, "Human 
Action and Political Action in Oedipus Tyrannos," Greek Tragedy and Political Theory, ed. J. Peter 
Euban (Berkeley: U of California P, 1986) 183-209; Nellhaus, "Literacy"; and Graham Ley, "Perform-
ance and Performatives" Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 8.1 (1998): 5-18. Ley's article 
appeared after this passage was written, but supports my claim that the actor emerged in classical 
Athens because of a communication-based crisis in representation that required agential self-reflexivity. 
40. Sex-gender structures (including family arrangements, gendered divisions of labor, 
and sexual dynamics) also shape concepts of agency, but given the manifold complexities of this area 
and the limitations of a single article, the issue cannot be addressed here with any adequacy. 
41. It can be shown that empiricism and positivism are themselves products of capitalist 
print culture, but such a demonstration lies beyond the scope of the present article. So too is the 
problem that these philosophies ultimately entail an incoherent, even self-contradictory concept of 
agency, often resulting in not just an overburdened agency responsible for all things, but also (and 
even simultaneously!) a denial of agency, an agency that simply leaves things as they are or is wholly 
the product of forces beyond its control (heredity, environment, society, language, libido...). From 
that perspective, metatheatricality in the nineteenth century resulted not only from secular social 
changes, but also from a conceptual fissure within the dominant ideologies. 
42. Hornby 114-17. 
43. See also Newey, esp. 87-90, on the use of plays-within-plays (instead of self-reference) 
to the same end in melodrama. 
44. Bjork, "Bachelorette," written by Bjork and Sigurjon Birgir Sigurdsson (a.k.a. Sjon), 
dir. Michel Gondry, Volumen, videocassette (Elektra Entertainment, 1998). The video was released 
in December 1997. The director, Michel Gondry, probably devised the idea for the video, which won 
an award for Best Art Direction from MTV in 1998, and was a 1999 Grammy Award nominee for 
Best Music Video (Short Form). Some may object that a music video shouldn't count as theater; I 
think this is mistakenly narrow, and a video seems perfect for strict self-reference, since its repeti-
tions and replays are virtually identical. 
45. Cf. Hornby 116. 
46. I am considering only the goals and methods that tend to characterize community-
Spring 2000 39 
based performance. Particular instances and projects may operate differently, or be undercut by 
contradictions in the social circumstances, process, etc. It seems likely that the advent of state-
subsidized theater has also chipped away at the entrepreneurial character of live performance, although 
in film and television production capitalist formations have taken gargantuan proportions. 
47. This paragraph draws heavily on Reiss, Discourse of Modernism, esp. 29-33, 42-51, 
55-107. 
48. Quoting Reiss, Discourse on Modernism 362. The collapse of being into knowledge 
of being, and the compulsive determination of knowledge by being, constitute the epistemic fallacy 
and the ontic fallacy, respectively. Both are underwritten by the anthropic fallacy, which comprehends 
being in terms of human being. All three have received critique in various works by Roy Bhaskar; 
see, for example, A Realist Theory of Science 36-45; Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom (London: 
Verso, 1993) 205. 
49. This holds for thought and social reality, since social structures exist independently of 
whatever people may think of them at any given moment, even if over time thought (through agents' 
actions) alter those structures. 
50. Bhaskar, Dialectic 44, 119, and quoting 205. This sort of performative contradiction 
is akin to what Reiss terms the "occupation" of a practice which, however, may emerge as a new 
basis for meaning (Reiss 96-97, 100-2 and passim). In this instance, experimentation itself is a 
practice that seemingly undergirds empiricism, yet can be adequately theorized neither by it nor by 
its subjectifying and linguisticizing opponents, whereas the effort to make experimentation intelligible 
leads in critical realist directions. On this issue see also Robert P. Crease, The Play of Nature: 
Experimentation as Performance (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1993). 
51. Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy 
(London: Verso, 1989) 84. 
40 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
